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Abstract 
This paper presents a secure distributed management framework for teams of Unmanned 
Autonomous Vehicles enabling distributed discovery of new team members, authentication 
and task allocation by any existing team member.    
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Introduction 
Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UXVs) 
need to flexibly adapt the behaviour of the 
team in terms of allocation of team 
members to roles depending on the 
capabilities and number of UXVs available. 
We make use of policy-based techniques to 
implement the adaptive management 
strategy as policies can be easily modified 
without reloading the basic software within 
a UXV. A UXV may be composed of 
various sensors for vision, sound, vibration, 
chemical detection, location as well as 
supporting communication links. Usually, 
not all capabilities are available in a single 
vehicle and so one UXV may provide 
services to others in the team.  
A UXV contains a capability description 
that describes its resources and the services 
it can perform. A commander, which could 
be a UXV or a more powerful processing 
platform, is preloaded with a mission 
specification from its command base. The 
mission specification defines the criteria 
such as capabilities or credentials required 
for assigning UXVs to mission roles within 
the team and how to  adapt the mission to 
failures, resources available or current 
context. UXVs may operate in a hostile 
environment so new members of the team 
must be authenticated and encryption keys 
provided to enable secure communication. 
In this paper, we extend the basic 
management architecture presented in [1] 
to support secure distributed control of a 
group of UXVs in that any authorised 
existing team member can authenticate and 
assign newly discovered UXVs to roles for 
which the existing member contains 
information. Authentication is implemented 
using a simple public-key certificate based 
system with dissemination of individual 
and group keys to enable secure interaction 
with other members of the team. 
We use the Ponder2 [2] policy framework 
which supports obligation policies (event-
condition-action rules) to trigger specific 
tasks to be performed when an event, such 
as the discovery of a new UXV occurs, or a 
sensor detects an object that requires 
further investigation. Authorisation policies 
specify what services and resources within 
a UXV can be accessed by other UXVs 
performing a specific role and under what 
conditions.  
Distributed Mission Management 
A mission for a team of heterogeneous 
robots is specified in terms of roles and the 
missions of each role. Consider a 
Reconnaissance Mission scenario to 
determine whether a house is safe to be 
entered by people. The following main 
roles are identified: 
• Commander (C): controls the mission 
and allocates UXVs to roles.  
• Surveyor (S): explores the house and 
builds a map.  
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• Hazardous material detector (H).  
• Communication relay (R): maintains 
communication among UXVs by 
forming an ad-hoc network.  
• Aggregator (A): aggregates information 
from all UXVs e.g. to produce a map 
showing the detected hazardous 
materials. 
Our Approach 
A set of UXVs should be able to perform a 
team mission with a minimum number of 
UXVs with required capabilities although 
the performance may not be optimal. When 
additional UXVs become available the 
team should expand to make use of the new 
resources, thereby increasing performance. 
Should there be a failure or departure of 
UXVs from the enlarged team, the team 
should contract but continue the mission. 
We define a minimal team configuration as 
the fewest types and number of UXVs 
needed to accomplish a mission. A 
reasonably-optimal team configuration has 
the ideal type and number of UXVs. A 
mission starts execution when a team 
satisfying the minimal configuration can be 
formed. The team will expand when 
additional UXVs join until it achieves the 
reasonably-optimal configuration. 
This concept is illustrated using the 
reconnaissance scenario in which the 
minimal configuration is one Commander, 
one Aggregator, and two Surveyors, where 
the Surveyor role is the primary role, and 
the Relay, Hazard detection roles are 
secondary roles. The primary role is given 
priority with respect to resource allocation 
and is also responsible for managing the 
other roles of the UXV. 
As shown in Figure 1 the Surveyor role is 
collocated with other roles: Relay and 
Hazardous material detector. The Relay 
role can be performed in parallel with 
either the Surveyor or the detector role 
while the UXV has to switch between the 
Surveyor and detector roles as only one of 
these can be active at a time. Although the 
Relay role can run in parallel with these 
roles, it will potentially hinder the 
surveying or detection missions when 
trying to maximise communication link 
quality. Hence this role is best placed in 
another UXV should there be one available. 
Detecting potentially hazardous objects is a 
much slower process than exploration 
which implies that the detection and 
surveying missions can be performed better 
by separate but cooperating UXVs which 
share information. 
A reasonably-optimal mission 
configuration consists of one Commander, 
two Surveyors, two Hazardous material 
detectors, two Relays, and one Aggregator. 
The team started with the configuration 
shown in Figure 1 and reached the 
configuration shown in Figure 2 as new 
UXVs join the team in the mission area. 
The Surveyor roles which handed out the 
Relay and detector roles serve as 
commanders for those two roles. Should 
any of the new UXVs fail or depart, the 
 
Figure 2: Reconnaissance mission 
reasonably-optimal configuration 
 
Figure 1: Reconnaissance mission minimal-
configuration 
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roles will revert to their minimal 
configuration position.  
A Conceptual Model of Mission and Role 
Team-mission (M) : A team-mission is a set 
of roles where each role contains a set of 
policies that either governs the behaviour of 
the role or handles the assignment of UXVs 
to roles. 
M = {R1, R2, R3, … Ri} 
Role (R) : A role is a placeholder to which 
discovered UXVs are assigned and for 
which, missions, tasks and authorisation 
policies are specified. The role is 
implemented as a set of three objects: role-
mission (RM), authorisations (A) and tasks 
(T), described below.  When a UXV is 
assigned to a role the role-mission, 
authorisations and tasks associated with the 
role are loaded onto the UXV, unless 
already present.  
R  {RM, A, T} 
Role-mission (RM) : A set of policies, 
relating to a single role, controlling tasks 
and enabling/disabling other policies.   
Authorisations (A) = {A1, A2, … Aj} : The 
authorisation policies specify how roles are 
permitted to interact with each other in 
terms of the events that can be triggered or 
operations that can be invoked via the 
external interface (see below). 
Tasks (T) = {T1, T2, …Tk} : Tasks are 
complex operations which the UXV can 
perform e.g. move from A to B, follow a 
path, track an object using video.  
Obligation policies in the mission may 
invoke operations supported by a task or 
activate a task.  The tasks in a role are 
usually inherent to the type of the role and 
hence are specified inside the role class. 
A role, in our model, has an external and 
local interface which provides a context for 
which role mission policies can be 
specified.  Incoming events from the local 
or external interface can be used to trigger 
policies which invoke operations provided 
by the local and external interfaces: 
External Interface  
The external interface defines operations 
and events relating to interaction with 
external collaborating roles: 
• Management operations for loading 
missions, policies etc. which are 
common to all roles. 
• Operations from the local interface that 
are made visible to and can be invoked 
by other roles i.e. other UXVs. 
Accessibility may be static or dynamic 
depending on the authorisation policies. 
The operations are implemented by the 
tasks in the role. 
• Events generated from within the role, 
by the tasks inside the role or propagated 
from the UXV components such as 
sensors, and published via an event bus 
for use by other roles.   
• Operations which are required by this 
role. These operations are expected to be 
provided by collaborating roles. 
• Events required by this role, generated 
by collaborating roles, e.g. to trigger 
policies.  
Local Interface 
The local interface defines the operations 
and events provided by tasks within the 
local UXV and used by the role-missions:  
• Events generated by the tasks within the 
UXV or propagated from the UXV 
components such as sensors.  These may 
be used to trigger policies in the mission 
or mapped to the external interface. 
• Operations implemented by the tasks 
within the UXV. 
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Specification of Distributed Missions 
We use three levels of specifications, as 
shown in Figure 3: (a) Policies are 
specified in Ponder-talk [2] which is 
compiled into the XML version of Ponder 
interpreted by the Ponder run-time system 
and stored in the policy repository, (b) the 
XML mission class specification of the 
types of roles needed for the mission, the 
policies required from the policy 
repository, and (c) the XML mission 
instance specification which defines the 
mission parameters and role cardinalities 
required to instantiate a mission class. The 
policy specification in the repository  may 
apply to multiple different mission classes 
and there can be multiple instances of a 
mission, instantiated with different 
parameters, from a particular mission class.   
Security of UXVs 
The UXVs forming a team can change 
dynamically over time with new UXVs 
joining or leaving the team. These new 
UXVs may also belong to other 
organisations (e.g. allies). Authenticating a 
UXV before it joins the SMC (Self 
Managed Cell) and protecting the ensuing 
group communication is thus necessary to 
ensure the credibility of the mission. 
Therefore, all SMCs provide the required 
mechanisms to perform authentication, 
encryption and access control. 
Consider the scenario depicted in Figure 4. 
UXV1, UXV2 and commander CD1 form 
SMC1, while UXV3, UXV4, UXV5 and 
commander CD2 form SMC2 and UXV6, 
UXV7 and commander CD3 form SMC3. 
SMC1 and SMC2 belong to the same 
organisation (HQ1), while SMC3 belongs to 
another organisation (HQ2). As shown in 
the figure, individual UXVs may join or 
leave a SMC group. For example, due to 
mission specifications UXV4 and UXV6 
may join SMC1 at a later stage, while 
UXV1 leaves the SMC. UXV4 joining 
SMC1 is called Intra-Joining since both 
SMC1 and SMC2 belong to the same 
organisation, while UXV6 joining SMC1 is 
called Inter-Joining since SMC3 belongs to 
a different organisational unit.  
In each of the above scenarios, it is 
important to be able to verify the 
authenticity of the UXV joining the SMC 
to ensure the security of the mission. The 
coalition between the different 
organisations is achieved by using the 
Central Command Centre (C3). The system 
uses the well known Certificate Public Key 
Infrastructure (C-PKI) to ensure 
authentication, confidentiality and message 
integrity among the UXVs. The system 
implemented assumes a single certification 
authority (C3), which issues certified 
public/private keys to UXVs belonging to 
all organisations. 
The C-PKI system is also used to exchange 
a common secret key generated using the 
Diffie-Hellman protocol between each 
member of the SMC and the SMC 
commander. The secret key effectively 
establishes a secure channel between the 
commander and each SMC member. When 
a UXV is assigned to a role-mission, the 
commander using the secure channel will 
send a group key (common to all members 
 
Policy 
Repository 
 
Mission class 
specification: 
Reconnaissance 
 
Mission class 
specification: 
Search & Rescue 
 
Mission class 
instance: 
Reconnaissance of 
building A 
Mission class 
instance: 
Reconnaissance of 
town B  
Figure 3: Mission Specification Levels
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of a role-mission), to it.  If an application 
requires broadcast communication between 
all members of a SMC that are assigned to  
the role-mission it can use the shared group 
key. To ensure future communications are 
secure, the group key is also changed 
periodically. Also, when a UXV leaves the 
SMC a new group key must be generated 
and distributed to the remaining members. 
The authentication is designed as part of 
the secure discovery service in the 
commander. The steps involved in the 
authentication between a UXV (A) and the 
commander (C) are shown below: 
1:  C ? A: {Cid} - Broadcast Discovery 
Message. 
2:  A ? C: {Aid, Join_Req, NonceA}  
A sends a Join_Req to join the SMC. 
3:  C ? A: sign{CertC,Cid, NonceA+1} 
C authenticates itself to A by sending 
its Public-Key Certificate (PKC) 
(issued by C3) and a function applied 
to NonceA, all signed with its private 
key. 
4:  A ? C: sign{CertA,Aid, NonceA+2}  
A sends its PKC (issued by C3) to C as 
well as a function applied to the 
received Nonce, all signed by its 
private  key.   
 If the certificates are verified by both 
A and C (using C3’s certificate), 
mutual authentication is achieved. 
5:  C ? A: sign{{DH values}Ka, NonceC}  
C sends the Diffie-Hellman parameters 
and keyshare encrypted with A’s 
public key. 
6:  A ? C: sign{{DH key}Kc, NonceC +1} 
A sends its Diffie-Hellman keyshare, 
encrypted with C’s public key. 
 Both A and C can now calculate a 
shared secret key (Kac) that is used to 
establish a secure channel between A 
and C. 
7: A ? C: {Capabilities}Kac 
A sends its capabilities, encrypted 
using Kac to C. 
8: C ? A: {Grp Key}Kac 
C sends required group keys e.g. for 
the role mission or all team members  
to A. 
Implementation 
Mission Management 
The management framework is 
implemented using the Java based Ponder2 
policy toolkit with Tasks, Roles and 
Missions implemented as Ponder2 managed 
 
Figure 4: Example of UXVs forming Self Managed Cells belonging to different organisations 
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objects. 
Tasks, Roles and Missions 
A Task class defines all the common 
behaviours of tasks and each specific task 
extends this class and adds specific 
behaviours.  
A Mission class extends the 
ManagementPolicy class, and holds a set of 
obligation policies which could be role 
assignment or operational policies, as well 
as providing methods for collectively 
managing these policies.  
A Role class contains a list of task, mission 
and authorisation objects. The mission 
object contains a set of policies. The task 
object contains a set of tasks expected to be 
performed by the role.  A Role class 
defines all the common behaviours of roles 
and a specific role extends this class and 
adds specific behaviours.  
A UXV can have a primary role and 
multiple secondary roles which are 
managed by the primary role. By 
management we mean the secondary roles 
can be started on the same UXV or 
assigned to another UXV by the primary 
role.  
Capabilities 
The capability of a UXV is the set of 
operations which the software and 
hardware in the UXV support as well as the 
events it generates. This depends on the 
current set of software tasks loaded into the 
UXV.  The capability specification of a 
UXV is generated dynamically by querying 
the tasks in a UXV. The Capability module 
is responsible for querying and preparing 
the description. Tasks support reflection so 
they can be queried for their interface 
description. The Capability module queries 
each task and produces the description 
based on the reply it gets. A task 
implements a task interface with a naming 
scheme where the interface name is the task 
name suffixed by an ‘I’. For instance, an 
Explorer task implements an interface 
called ExplorerI. To facilitate the capability 
description generation, we annotate task 
interfaces using two annotations, namely 
@TaskInterface and @TaskEvent. The 
@TaskInterface annotation is used to mark 
(and indicate the name of corresponding 
task) that an interface is a task-interface in 
that it has operations/events that can be 
included in the capability description. This 
marking is used later on while generating 
the capability description to differentiate 
between the different interfaces a task 
implements. The @TaskEvent annotation is 
used to mark events so that we can 
differentiate between the task’s operations 
and its events. 
As discussed in the previous section, tasks 
extend the Task class which supports our 
algorithm for capability description 
generation of a single task. The algorithm 
reads the interfaces implemented by the 
task reflectively and decides whether to 
consider the interface in general or the 
methods of the interface in particular by 
Determine, reflectively, all interfaces implemented by the task  
FOR all interfaces implemented by the task 
Check for a  @TaskInterface annotation  
IF  the annotation is detected THEN 
    Check if the task matches the task indicated in the annotation  
         IF it matches THEN 
 FOR all methods in the interface 
      Check for a @TaskEvent annotation 
      IF the annotation is detected THEN 
          Add the method to the description as an event 
     ELSE 
          Read the argument types reflectively 
                        Add the method as an operation 
    ENDIF 
       ELSE 
 Return error 
      ENDIF 
ELSE 
      Return empty description  
ENDIF 
Figure 5: Pseudo code of reflective Capability 
Description generation algorithm 
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using the annotations.  The pseudo code of 
this algorithm is shown in Figure 5. 
Security 
The authentication scheme detailed in the 
‘Security of UXVs’ section is implemented 
as part of the Discovery service of the 
UXV. Once a UXV has discovered the 
commander, it proceeds to authenticate 
itself to the commander. 
Certificates are generated using openssl [8]. 
Each UXV contains its own certificate, as 
does the commander. During the 
authentication process, the UXV and 
commander exchange and verify their 
respective certificates by using the 
certificate belonging to the Central 
Command Centre. The functions that 
enable these operations are available as part 
of the java.security package in Java.  
Once authentication is completed, the 
Diffie-Hellman (DH) key parameters are 
generated, the respective DH key shares are 
exchanged and the shared secret key is 
created. The functions that support 
cryptographic and key generation 
operations are available as part of the 
javax.crypto package in Java. 
Related Work 
Iocchi [9] et. al. present an approach for 
coordination of robots based on dynamic 
role assignment. The architecture of the 
system is layered with a coordination 
protocol running on top of a 
communication protocol. The basis of the 
communication protocol is the publish-
subscribe paradigm. The coordination 
protocol is based on utility functions. A 
utility function is defined for each role. The 
robot with the highest value for a certain 
role will take that role. Formation is 
selected using a voting system. Compared 
to other works of coordination (e.g. [13]), 
which tie the robot control architecture to 
the coordination architecture (mechanism), 
the authors' architecture is more general in 
that robots of different control architectures 
can coordinate. 
In [10], the authors present the Contract 
Net protocol for distributing tasks through 
negotiation. Each node in the net takes one 
of the two roles, namely manager or 
contractor. Managers announce tasks, 
potential contractors submit bids to the 
managers, the managers then evaluate the 
bids and award contracts to the bidders. 
The contents of the negotiation messages 
are problem-domain dependent and the user 
is responsible for specifying the content. 
In [11], the authors present a paradigm for 
cooperating robots. In their approach, each 
robot has a hybrid automaton. Hybrid 
automata are used to represent roles, role 
assignments and discrete variables related 
to each robot. The composition of these 
automata is used to model execution of 
cooperative tasks. They define a role as a 
function one or more robots perform during 
the execution of a cooperative task and use 
utility functions to decide when to change 
roles.  
In [12], the authors present a general 
framework, called MURDOCH, for inter-
robot communication and dynamic tasks 
allocation for cooperation. Communication 
takes place through a publish/subscribe 
system. MURDOCH offers a distributed 
approximation to a global optimum of 
resource usage.  As a result of a completely 
distributed task assignment scheme, 
MURDOCH suffers the same problem as 
the greedy algorithms problem - equivalent 
to an instantaneous greedy scheduler, 
where decisions are made based on only the 
current and/or local situation without taking 
into account how the decision might affect 
the future and/or the global situation. In 
effect these types of algorithms may not 
always give the best solution.  
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Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented our 
approach for distributed self management 
of UXVs. We have also presented concepts 
and some implementation details for the 
management architecture and capability 
description generation. Security among the 
UXVs is achieved by using a public-key 
certificate based system. The proposed 
scheme provides mutual authentication and 
also provides a mechanism to securely 
communicate with the commander, as well 
as other group members. The management 
architecture is policy based and the 
implementation is done on the Ponder2 
system. We generate capabilities of UXVs 
dynamically and the capabilities are used in 
the role assignment process. 
Future work will mainly focus on failure 
management, communication management 
and integrating the different parts of the 
framework, including, the security modules 
and testing.  In addition we will extend the 
Ponder-talk language to enable direct 
specification of missions which will 
combine the policy specification and 
mission class specification levels shown in 
Figure 3, and provide a more user-friendly 
means of specifying missions. 
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